# CVE-2026-32021: openclaw — Fixed in 2026.2.22

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

# CVE-2026-32021 — openclaw

[Fix: openclaw/openclaw@4ed87a6](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/4ed87a667263ed2d422b9d5d5a5d326e099f92c7)

CVE-2026-32021 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenClaw < 2026.2.22 - Authorization Bypass via Display Name Collision in Feishu allowFrom

Also known as[GHSA-j4xf-96qf-rx69](/vulnerability/GHSA-j4xf-96qf-rx69)

Published

Mar 19, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

## Exploitation Status

### No confirmed exploitation observed yet

-   CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
-   CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32021.

## EPSS Exploitation Probability

[via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/)

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk+0.01%

Lower risk than most CVEs12th percentile — riskier than 12% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

0.00%0.29%0.57%0.86%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/).

## Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

133other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

`openclaw`npm

2.9Mdownloads / week

## Description

#### Summary

Feishu allowlist authorization could be bypassed by display-name collision.

#### Details

`channels.feishu.allowFrom` is documented as an ID-based allowlist (open\_id list), but Feishu policy matching accepted mutable sender display names in the same namespace. An attacker could set a display name equal to an allowlisted ID string and pass authorization checks.

The fix enforces ID-only matching for Feishu allowlist checks, normalizes Feishu ID prefixes during comparison, and ignores mutable display names for authorization.

#### Impact

Deployments using Feishu allowlist-based authorization could incorrectly authorize non-allowlisted senders when a colliding display name was used.

#### Affected Packages / Versions

-   Package: `openclaw` (npm)
-   Latest published version at triage time: `2026.2.21-2`
-   Affected range: `<= 2026.2.21-2`
-   Planned patched version: `>= 2026.2.22`

#### Fix Commit(s)

-   `4ed87a667263ed2d422b9d5d5a5d326e099f92c7`

#### Release Process Note

`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`>= 2026.2.22`) so the advisory is ready to publish once that npm release is available.

OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.

## Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem

Package

Vulnerable range

Fix

📦npm

`openclaw` 

all versions

2026.2.22`npm install openclaw@2026.2.22`

## Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

`openclaw`openclaw

< 2026.2.22

range

## Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

1.  ### Detect
    
    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
    
2.  ### Fix
    
    Update openclaw to 2026.2.22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32021 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
    
3.  ### Workarounds
    
    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
    

## Frequently Asked Questions

\### Summary Feishu allowlist authorization could be bypassed by display-name collision. ### Details \`channels.feishu.allowFrom\` is documented as an ID-based allowlist (open\_id list), but Feishu policy matching accepted mutable sender display names in the same namespace. An attacker could set a display name equal to an allowlisted ID string and pass authorization checks. The fix enforces ID-only matching for Feishu allowlist checks, normalizes Feishu ID prefixes during comparison, and ignores mutable display names for authorization. ### Impact Deployments using Feishu allowlist-based auth

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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