# CVE-2026-25761: super-linter — Fixed in 8.3.1 📦 📦 GitHub Actions Not in CISA KEV HIGH severity # CVE-2026-25761 — super-linter HIGH CVE-2026-25761 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-77 vulnerability in super-linter/super-linter. A fix is available for super-linter/super-linter — see the affected versions and patch details below. Command injection via crafted filenames in Super-linter Action Also known as[GHSA-r79c-pqj3-577x](/vulnerability/GHSA-r79c-pqj3-577x) Published Feb 9, 2026 Updated Oct 28, 2026 Affected 2 pkgs Patched 2 / 2 Exploits None indexed Exploitation data as of Oct 31, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS) ## Exploitation Status ### No confirmed exploitation observed yet - A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access. - CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment. Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-25761. ## EPSS Exploitation Probability [via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/) 1.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days Lower Risk\-0.65% Lower risk than most CVEs74th percentile — riskier than 74% of all scored CVEsHighest risk 0.00%0.93%1.85%2.78%0.0%1.5%May 26Aug 26Oct 26 Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/). ## How urgent is this, really ## Where this sits among everything scored ## Real-World Exposure 2 pkgs affected 📦`super-linter/super-linter`📦`super-linter/super-linter/slim` Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems. ## Description #### Summary The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to **command injection via crafted filenames**. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose **name** contains shell command substitution syntax, such as `$(...)`. In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s `GITHUB_TOKEN` depending on how the workflow configures permissions. #### Details The issue appears originates in the logic that scans the repository for changed files to check. 1. Use a workflow that runs Super-linter on `pull_request` events. 2. Open a pull request that adds a new file with a crafted filename containing command substitution and an outbound request that includes `$GITHUB_TOKEN`. 3. Run the workflow. #### Impact - **Arbitrary command execution** in the context of the workflow run that invokes Super-linter (triggered by attacker-controlled filenames in a PR). - **Credential exposure / misuse:** the injected command can read environment variables available to the action, including `GITHUB_TOKEN`. The level of exposure depends on the source of the pull request. To actively exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs have the ability to run workflows without any [approval from the repository admin](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/manage-workflow-runs/approve-runs-from-forks). Also, the `GITHUB_TOKEN` needs to have unconstrained access to repository resources. Even in that case, for pull request coming from forked repositories, no secrets are passed to the forked repository when running workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, and the `GITHUB_TOKEN` drops and write permission on the source repository [source](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/events-that-trigger-workflows#workflows-in-forked-repositories). Finally, although not specific to this vulnerability, we recommend auditing `workflow_call` and `pull_request_target` workflows because they can lead to compromise, regardless of whether you're using Super-linter, or not, as [explained by this GitHub Enterprise doc](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/security/secure-use#mitigating-the-risks-of-untrusted-code-checkout). ## Affected Packages 2 total 2 fixed Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range Fix 📦GitHub Actions `super-linter/super-linter` ≥ 6.0.0&&< 8.3.1 8.3.1 📦GitHub Actions `super-linter/super-linter/slim` ≥ 6.0.0&&< 8.3.1 8.3.1 ## Affected Products 1 product · 1 configurations Application `super-linter`super-linter\_project ≥ 6.0.0 && < 8.3.1 range ## Detection & mitigation playbook Open-source dependency 1. ### Detect Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for super-linter/super-linter, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version. 2. ### Fix Update super-linter/super-linter to 8.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-25761 is resolved across your whole dependency graph. 3. ### Workarounds Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does. ## Frequently Asked Questions \### Summary The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to \*\*command injection via crafted filenames\*\*. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose \*\*name\*\* contains shell command substitution syntax, such as \`$(...)\`. In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s \`GITHUB\_TOKEN\` depending on how the workflow configures permissio O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA ### Is CVE-2026-25761 in your dependencies? Find it across GitHub Actions, including transitive dependencies. [Scan my dependencies](/book-demo) [How O3 SCA works](/impact-aware-sca)