{"id":"CVE-2026-13622","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-13622","summary":"A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via…","details":"A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.","published":"2026-08-12T21:17:35.630","modified":"2026-08-12T21:17:35.630","cvss":{"score":8.8,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13622"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2494142"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","NVD","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T21:17:35.630"}}