{"id":"CVE-2026-130007","aliases":["GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-130007","summary":"k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution","details":"## Summary\nWhen k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP `tools/call`\nendpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check.\nAny client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the\nserver's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials,\nexecuting with the server's configured cluster privileges.\n\n## Affected\nCommit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130)\nMCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0\nDefault mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0\n\n## Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)\n- main.go L129: `server.NewSSEServer(s)` is created with no auth option and no\n  contextFunc; L130 `sse.Start(\":\"+port)` binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0).\n- mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a\n  sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.\n- handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable\n  sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before\n  `s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage)` dispatches to the tools/call handler.\n- Only `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` is present (CORS relaxation, not auth).\nWrite tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback)\nare all registered unless `-read-only` is set (default readOnly=false).\n\n## Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)\nStarted: `k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080` with a dummy non-routable\nKUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).\n\n  GET  /sse                         -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3...\n  POST /message initialize          -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE\n  POST /message tools/list          -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive)\n  POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED:\n        error -32603 \"... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect\"\n\nThe tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection\nerror, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the\ngetAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real\ncluster data. `ss -ltnp` confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).\n\n## Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and\ninvoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and,\nwith default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm).\nCWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).\n\n## Why this is a defect, not by-design\nDefault mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal\nscenario, and there is no \"trusted client only\" / auth-required note in the docs.\nMCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.\n\n## Suggested fix\n- Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g.\n  WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed\n  when no token is configured in HTTP mode.\n- Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.\n- Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO\n  by default.\n\nReproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path\n(not an extract). \n\n## Credit \nbebold6133","published":"2026-11-18T16:38:22.395Z","modified":"2026-11-19T21:00:35.616743253Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.0037,"percentile":0.31603,"asOf":"2026-11-19"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server","fixedVersion":"1.1.0"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/commit/817d81005369837e0c034962785851ca4dec9a76","label":"reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server@817d810"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.1.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/130xxx/CVE-2026-130007.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130007"},{"type":"REPORT","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/issues/131"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/commit/817d81005369837e0c034962785851ca4dec9a76"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/pull/134"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T21:00:35.616743253Z"}}