{"id":"CVE-2026-109549","aliases":["GHSA-w3w6-9m25-g88p"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-109549","summary":"OmniFaces: SSE push channels are not bound to their owning HTTP session","details":"## Summary\n\n[GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92) (fixed 5.4.2) bound session- and view-scoped **WebSocket** (`o:socket`) push channels to the HTTP session that registered them, so a leaked channel ID can no longer be connected to from a foreign or absent HTTP session. The fix ([`d5cae243c4`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/d5cae243c4692555efaa4ba774e0f8f60e3f4db5)) touched only the `Socket*` classes.\n\nThe parallel **SSE** (`o:sse`, added in 5.2) push transport was left unchanged. `SseEndpoint.doGet` accepts a connection whenever the presented channel ID is in the application-wide registry, without ever checking that the caller's HTTP session owns it. A leaked session/view-scoped SSE channel ID can therefore be replayed from any (or no) HTTP session to receive the messages pushed to it — exactly the behaviour the advisory removed for WebSocket, still present on SSE at the latest release.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nBoth push transports share the same base classes. A session- or view-scoped channel ID is minted as `channel + \"?\" + UUID.randomUUID()` and registered only in an application-scoped, session-agnostic registry: [`PushChannelManager#L123`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/blob/7cd869c039c22c8a107547ec118717cd9b68305b/src/main/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/PushChannelManager.java#L123) mints it and [`#L136`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/blob/7cd869c039c22c8a107547ec118717cd9b68305b/src/main/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/PushChannelManager.java#L136) calls `getPushSessions().register(channelId)`; the registry's membership test is [`PushSessionManager#L137-L139`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/blob/7cd869c039c22c8a107547ec118717cd9b68305b/src/main/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/PushSessionManager.java#L137-L139):\n\n```java\nprotected boolean isRegistered(String channelId) {\n    return sessions.containsKey(channelId); // keyed by channelId only — no HTTP-session dimension\n}\n```\n\n**WebSocket (fixed).** `SocketChannelManager.register` additionally records session/view channel IDs on the HTTP session, and the handshake refuses anything not owned by the caller's session, at [`SocketEndpoint.java#L133-L142`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/blob/7cd869c039c22c8a107547ec118717cd9b68305b/src/main/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/SocketEndpoint.java#L133-L142):\n\n```java\nif (\n    !SocketChannelManager.isApplicationScopedChannelId(channelId)\n        && !SocketChannelManager.isChannelIdRegisteredInSession((HttpSession) request.getHttpSession(), channelId)\n) {\n    throw new IllegalStateException(ERROR_UNAUTHORIZED_CHANNEL);\n}\n```\n\n**SSE (unfixed).** `SseChannelManager` extends the base `register()` unchanged (no HTTP-session registration), and the endpoint's sole accept gate is the global `isRegistered` check, at [`SseEndpoint.java#L59-L66`](https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/blob/7cd869c039c22c8a107547ec118717cd9b68305b/src/main/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/SseEndpoint.java#L59-L66):\n\n```java\nvar channel = getChannel(request);\nvar channelId = channel + \"?\" + request.getQueryString();\nvar sseSessions = Beans.getReference(SseSessionManager.class);\n\nif (channel == null || !sseSessions.isRegistered(channelId)) {\n    response.getOutputStream().write(SSE_NOT_FOUND_EVENT);\n    return;\n}\n// ...accepts: startAsync() and streams events for this channel\n```\n\n`doGet` never calls `request.getSession(...)`; no `Sse*` class consults the HTTP session for the accept decision. So for a session/view-scoped channel ID the fix intends to bind, WebSocket refuses a foreign/absent session while SSE accepts it. (Application-scoped channels are unbound by design on both transports — not at issue here.)\n\nRelated, same root cause: the idle-timeout and max-sessions-per-channel bounds the fix added to `SocketEndpoint` / `SocketSessionManager` were also not ported to SSE — `SseEndpoint.doGet` sets `asyncContext.setTimeout(0)` and `SseSessionManager` inherits the unbounded `getMaxSessionsPerChannel()`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nThe PoC drives the real `SseEndpoint.doGet` from omnifaces 5.4.2 and shows it accepts a leaked session-scoped channel ID from a request carrying no owning HTTP session (and never consults the session), while the WebSocket fix refuses the same class of ID.\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- JDK 21 or newer (tested on Temurin/Zulu 21 and OpenJDK 25)\n- Apache Maven 3.9+\n\n### Step 1: Create the project\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/omnifaces-sse-poc/src/test/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push\ncd /tmp/omnifaces-sse-poc\ncat > pom.xml <<'EOF'\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<project xmlns=\"http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0\"\n         xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n         xsi:schemaLocation=\"http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 http://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd\">\n    <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>\n    <groupId>poc</groupId>\n    <artifactId>omnifaces-sse-poc</artifactId>\n    <version>1.0</version>\n    <packaging>jar</packaging>\n    <properties>\n        <maven.compiler.release>21</maven.compiler.release>\n        <project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding>\n    </properties>\n    <dependencies>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>org.omnifaces</groupId>\n            <artifactId>omnifaces</artifactId>\n            <version>5.4.2</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>jakarta.servlet</groupId>\n            <artifactId>jakarta.servlet-api</artifactId>\n            <version>6.1.0</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>jakarta.enterprise</groupId>\n            <artifactId>jakarta.enterprise.cdi-api</artifactId>\n            <version>4.1.0</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>jakarta.websocket</groupId>\n            <artifactId>jakarta.websocket-api</artifactId>\n            <version>2.2.0</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>org.apache.myfaces.core</groupId>\n            <artifactId>myfaces-api</artifactId>\n            <version>4.1.0</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>jakarta.el</groupId>\n            <artifactId>jakarta.el-api</artifactId>\n            <version>6.0.0</version>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>\n            <artifactId>junit-jupiter</artifactId>\n            <version>5.11.3</version>\n            <scope>test</scope>\n        </dependency>\n        <dependency>\n            <groupId>org.mockito</groupId>\n            <artifactId>mockito-core</artifactId>\n            <version>5.14.2</version>\n            <scope>test</scope>\n        </dependency>\n    </dependencies>\n    <build>\n        <plugins>\n            <plugin>\n                <groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>\n                <artifactId>maven-surefire-plugin</artifactId>\n                <version>3.5.1</version>\n            </plugin>\n        </plugins>\n    </build>\n</project>\nEOF\n```\n\n### Step 2: Add the test\n\n```bash\ncd /tmp/omnifaces-sse-poc\ncat > src/test/java/org/omnifaces/cdi/push/SseChannelBindingPoCTest.java <<'EOF'\npackage org.omnifaces.cdi.push;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;\nimport static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyBoolean;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.RETURNS_DEEP_STUBS;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.atLeastOnce;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.mock;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.mockStatic;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.never;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;\nimport static org.mockito.Mockito.when;\n\nimport java.lang.reflect.Field;\nimport java.util.UUID;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\nimport org.mockito.MockedStatic;\nimport org.omnifaces.util.Beans;\n\nimport jakarta.servlet.AsyncContext;\nimport jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;\nimport jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;\n\n// Placed in package org.omnifaces.cdi.push to reach the protected/package-private push internals.\nclass SseChannelBindingPoCTest {\n\n    // Drives the REAL SseEndpoint.doGet from omnifaces 5.4.2 (the advisory-patched release).\n    // A session-scoped SSE channel id that leaked is accepted from a request that carries no\n    // owning HTTP session, and the endpoint never even calls getSession().\n    @Test\n    void sse_endpoint_accepts_leaked_channel_from_a_request_with_no_session() throws Exception {\n        SseSessionManager registry = new SseSessionManager();          // the @ApplicationScoped global registry\n        setField(registry, \"sseUsers\", mock(SseUserManager.class));    // consulted by add(); return null user\n\n        String channel = \"clock\";\n        String uuid = UUID.randomUUID().toString();\n        String leakedChannelId = channel + \"?\" + uuid;                 // session-scoped id = channel + \"?\" + UUID\n        registry.register(leakedChannelId);                            // victim's page registered it at push time\n\n        HttpServletRequest request = mock(HttpServletRequest.class, RETURNS_DEEP_STUBS);\n        when(request.getPathInfo()).thenReturn(\"/\" + channel);\n        when(request.getQueryString()).thenReturn(uuid);\n        AsyncContext asyncContext = mock(AsyncContext.class);\n        when(request.startAsync()).thenReturn(asyncContext);\n        HttpServletResponse response = mock(HttpServletResponse.class, RETURNS_DEEP_STUBS);\n\n        try (MockedStatic<Beans> beans = mockStatic(Beans.class)) {\n            beans.when(() -> Beans.getReference(SseSessionManager.class)).thenReturn(registry);\n\n            new SseEndpoint().doGet(request, response);                // the real endpoint\n\n            verify(request).startAsync();                              // accept branch: event stream opened\n            assertTrue(registry.isRegistered(leakedChannelId));        // attacker connection registered under victim's id\n            verify(request, never()).getSession();                     // endpoint NEVER consults the HTTP session\n            verify(request, never()).getSession(anyBoolean());\n            verify(response, never()).getOutputStream();               // 404 reject branch NOT taken\n            beans.verify(() -> Beans.getReference(SseSessionManager.class), atLeastOnce());\n        }\n    }\n\n    // The differential: GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92 added exactly this binding to the WebSocket transport.\n    // For the same class of leaked session-scoped id, a caller with no owning HTTP session is refused.\n    @Test\n    void websocket_fix_binds_the_same_class_of_id_to_the_http_session() {\n        String leakedSessionScopedChannelId = \"clock?\" + UUID.randomUUID();\n        assertFalse(SocketChannelManager.isChannelIdRegisteredInSession(null, leakedSessionScopedChannelId));\n        assertFalse(SocketChannelManager.isApplicationScopedChannelId(leakedSessionScopedChannelId));\n    }\n\n    private static void setField(Object target, String name, Object value) throws Exception {\n        Field field = SseSessionManager.class.getDeclaredField(name);\n        field.setAccessible(true);\n        field.set(target, value);\n    }\n}\nEOF\n```\n\n### Step 3: Run\n\n```bash\ncd /tmp/omnifaces-sse-poc\nmvn -B test -DargLine=\"-Dnet.bytebuddy.experimental=true\"\n```\n\nThe `net.bytebuddy.experimental` flag lets Mockito's inline mock maker run on JDK 25; it is harmless on JDK 21-24.\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\n[INFO]  T E S T S\n[INFO] Running org.omnifaces.cdi.push.SseChannelBindingPoCTest\n[INFO] Tests run: 2, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0\n[INFO] BUILD SUCCESS\n```\n\n`sse_endpoint_accepts_leaked_channel_from_a_request_with_no_session` passing means the real `SseEndpoint.doGet` opened the event stream for the leaked channel ID (`startAsync` called, connection registered, no `404` written) without ever calling `getSession()`. `websocket_fix_binds_the_same_class_of_id_to_the_http_session` passing shows the WebSocket fix refuses that same class of ID for a caller with no owning session.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nPort the WebSocket session binding to SSE: register session/view scoped channel IDs on the HTTP session (as `SocketChannelManager.registerChannelIdInSession` does) and, in `SseEndpoint.doGet`, refuse the connection unless the channel is application-scoped or `isChannelIdRegisteredInSession(request.getSession(false), channelId)`. Also port the idle-timeout and max-sessions-per-channel bounds to `SseEndpoint` / `SseSessionManager`. (Advisory only.)\n\n## Cleanup\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/omnifaces-sse-poc\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that uses `<o:sse>` / `@Push(type=SSE)` with `scope=\"session\"`, `scope=\"view\"`, or a `user` attribute pushes messages intended for one session/user. The channel ID (`channel + \"?\" + UUID`) is a per-session/view secret carried in the SSE request URL, so it is exposed anywhere such URLs are logged: proxy and server access logs (CWE-598), APM / error reports, `Referer` headers, or a shared/copied link. An attacker who obtains a victim's channel ID can, from a different browser or with no session at all, connect to the SSE endpoint and receive every message the application pushes to that channel — data the scope exists to keep private to the victim. This is the same replay the maintainer fixed for the WebSocket transport in GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92 (issue: session/view channels connectable from a foreign or absent HTTP session), still reachable on SSE at 5.4.2. The concrete confidentiality depends on what the application pushes to the scope; the attacker only receives (no message injection). It requires prior exposure of the channel ID, matching the advisory's own threat model for the WebSocket case.","published":"2026-11-17T21:29:01.768Z","modified":"2026-11-19T21:00:12.582342423Z","cvss":{"score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"},"epss":{"score":0.00347,"percentile":0.29016,"asOf":"2026-11-20"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","name":"org.omnifaces:omnifaces","fixedVersion":"5.4.3"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/78fe2b6989387f93718bdb932fb4497e338dd638","label":"omnifaces/omnifaces@78fe2b6"},"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/109xxx/CVE-2026-109549.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-w3w6-9m25-g88p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109549"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/78fe2b6989387f93718bdb932fb4497e338dd638"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T21:00:12.582342423Z"}}