{"id":"CVE-2026-105744","aliases":["GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-105744","summary":"Docling: Arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine","details":"### Summary\n\nWhen the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (`LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine=\"tectonic\")`), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted `.tex` file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True`, the document can run shell commands through `\\write18`.\n\n### Details\n\n`docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py` writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the `tectonic` binary on it. `_resolve_local_dependency` only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so:\n\n- `\\input{/abs/path}`, `\\verbatiminput{...}` and `\\openin` read arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memory `DocumentStream`, staging is skipped entirely.\n- `\\immediate\\openout` / `\\write` create or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's `--untrusted` flag does not block them either.\n\nSeparately, the `TectonicEngine` constructor defaults to `allow_shell_escape=True`. The LaTeX backend always passes `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape` explicitly (default `False`), so this default only affects code that instantiates `TectonicEngine` directly.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\n- Affected: callers that set `tikz_engine=\"tectonic\"`, have a `tectonic` binary available (on `PATH` or in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX.\n- Not affected: the default configuration (`tikz_engine=None`). docling does not install `tectonic` automatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it.\n\n### Impact\n\nDisclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```latex\n\\documentclass{article}\n\\usepackage{tikz}\n\\begin{document}\n\\begin{tikzpicture}\n  \\immediate\\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt\n  \\immediate\\write15{written by the input document}\n  \\immediate\\closeout15\n  \\node {x};\n\\end{tikzpicture}\n\\end{document}\n```\n\nConverting this file with `LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine=\"tectonic\")` creates `/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt`.\n\n### Patches\n\nMitigated in docling 2.132.0 by [#4419](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4419):\n\n- `TectonicEngine` now defaults to `allow_shell_escape=False`, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with `--untrusted` and `--only-cached`.\n- Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the `\\openin`, `\\openout`, `\\XeTeXpicfile` or `\\XeTeXpdffile` primitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in `\\input`, `\\include`, `\\includegraphics`, `\\InputIfFileExists` or `\\graphicspath`.\n\nThis check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the [pipeline options reference](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/blob/main/docs/reference/pipeline_options.md), untrusted LaTeX rendered with `tikz_engine=\"tectonic\"` should still be processed in an isolated environment.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:\n\n- Do not enable `tikz_engine=\"tectonic\"` for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network).\n- Never set `tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True` for untrusted input.","published":"2026-10-05T21:26:56.685Z","modified":"2026-10-07T02:47:27.667285313Z","cvss":{"score":7.5,"severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","name":"docling","fixedVersion":"2.132.0"},{"ecosystem":"PyPI","name":"docling-slim","fixedVersion":"2.132.0"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling/commit/38b6fa0a465d46fdacbbec333f50fa19c4f6b342","label":"docling-project/docling@38b6fa0"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.132.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/105xxx/CVE-2026-105744.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105744"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling/commit/38b6fa0a465d46fdacbbec333f50fa19c4f6b342"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4419"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-10-07T02:47:27.667285313Z"}}