{"id":"CVE-2026-100689","aliases":[],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2026-100689","summary":"GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name()…","details":"GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.","published":"2026-09-26T14:16:53.420","modified":"2026-09-26T14:16:53.420","cvss":{"score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"},"epss":null,"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":null,"affectedPackages":[],"fix":null,"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-3.1.62-path-traversal-via-gitmodules-path"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","NVD","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-09-26T14:16:53.420"}}