{"id":"CVE-2025-52884","aliases":["GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2"],"url":"https://o3.security/vulnerability/CVE-2025-52884","summary":"risc0-ethereum-contracts allows invalid commitment with digest value of zero to be accepted by Steel.validateCommitment","details":"### Impact\n\nPrior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.\n\nThis violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).\n\nBecause this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.\n\n### Fix\n\nPlease see [#605] for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` [2.1.1] and [2.2.0].\n\n### Recommended actions\n\nUsers for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the [ERC-20 counter example][example], and [documentation]. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.\n\nUsers not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.\n\n### Credit\n\nA thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue\n\n[#605]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605\n[example]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63\n[documentation]: https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain\n[2.1.1]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1\n[2.2.0]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0","published":"2025-06-24T20:20:17.287Z","modified":"2026-08-12T03:51:14.602806403Z","cvss":null,"epss":{"score":0.00364,"percentile":0.29036,"asOf":"2026-08-24"},"cisaKev":null,"exploitsKnown":0,"affectedPackages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"risc0-ethereum-contracts","fixedVersion":"2.1.1"}],"fix":{"url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/commit/3bbac859c7132b21ba5fdf2d47f1dd52e7e73d98","label":"risc0/risc0-ethereum@3bbac85"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/52xxx/CVE-2025-52884.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52884"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/commit/3bbac859c7132b21ba5fdf2d47f1dd52e7e73d98"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum"}],"provenance":{"sources":["OSV.dev","FIRST.org (EPSS)"],"lastVerified":"2026-08-12T03:51:14.602806403Z"}}